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Abstract
We discuss some vulnerabilities, threats and counter-measures for
voter-verifiable, cryptographic election schemes: Chaum [1], Neff [7]
and Preˆt a` Voter schemes [2]. Our analysis shows that such schemes are
potentially prey to a wide variety of threats, both technical and socio-
technical. On the other hand, counter-measures can be deployed to all
the threats identified. This paper strives to take initial steps towards a
more systematic therat analysis for such schemes. We briefly address
the issue of how to ensure such threat analyses are as systematic and
complete as possible.
1 Introduction
Traditional voting systems typically depend on rather strong trust assump-
tions: that officials act honourably, that hardware and software behaves
correctly etc. Often such trust assumptions turn out to be ill-founded, as
vividly documented in the US context in [3] for example.
Recently cryptographic schemes hold out the promise of providing a
high degree of assurance with minimal trust assumptions by introducing
a high degree of transparency and verifiability. Notable examples are the
Chaum [1], Neff [6], [7] schemes and Preˆt a` Voter [2].
Such schemes provide a high degree of assurance with minimal trust
assumptions. However, careful analysis shows that great care still needs
∗University of Newcastle
†University of Newcastle
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to be taken in implementing such schemes and in embedding them in the
surrounding socio-technical system. In this position paper, we identify a
number of vulnerabilities of such voter-verifiable schemes.
2 Voter-verifiability
The key idea behind voter-verifiable schemes, in very abstract terms, is to
provide the voter, at the time of vote casting, with a (unique) receipt with
their vote in encrypted form. Once the election has closed, receipts are
posted to a secure Web Bulletin Board (WBB) and voters are invited to
check that their receipt is accurately posted and included in the tabulation
process. The tabulation, performed by a number of trustees or tellers with
appropriate keys, is performed in a publicly verifiable fashion but in such
a way as to ensure secrecy, i.e. decrypted votes cannot be linked back to
receipts. Various mechanisms are deployed to ensure that votes will be
correctly encrypted and subsequently decrypted.
This approach has been realised in a number of ways in various schemes.
The Chaum scheme implements receipt encryption using visual cryptogra-
phy whilst Neff’s uses ElGamal. Below we give a sketch of the Preˆt a` Voter
scheme that we will use to illustrate the threats.
3 Outline of Preˆt a` Voter Scheme
We now present a brief outline of the supervised version of the Preˆt a` Voter
scheme. For full details see [2]. Once registered in the polling station, voters
select a ballot form, sealed in an envelope, at random. A typical example is
shown below.
Democritus
Plato
Socrates
Thales
7rJ94K
In the isolation of the booth, the voter makes her selection by, for ex-
ample, placing a cross in the right-hand (RH) column against the candidate
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of choice. The left-hand (LH) column, that carries the candidate list, is dis-
carded leaving the ballot receipt. In this case, voting for Plato, the receipt
would appear as follows:
X
7rJ94K
The voter then leaves the booth and casts their vote in the presence of
an official: the receipt is placed under an optical reader, or similar device, to
record the cryptographic value at the bottom of the strip, and the numerical
representation of the cell into which the cross has been entered. The voter
retains a digitally signed, franked hard copy of the RH strip as her receipt.
The candidate lists on the ballot forms are randomised. Thus, with the
LH strip removed and in the absence of the appropriate decryption keys,
the RH strip does not indicate how the vote was cast.
The cryptographic value printed on the bottom of the receipt, the “onion”,
is the key to extraction of the vote. Buried cryptographically in this value,
is the seed information needed to reconstruct the candidate list. Thus, only
a threshold subset of tellers holding the appropriate keys are able to recon-
struct the candidate order and so interpret the vote value encoded on the
receipt.
Once the election has closed, the receipts are transmitted to a central
tabulation server which posts them to a secure Web bulletin board (WBB).
This is an append-only, publicly visible facility. Only the tabulation server
can write to this and, once written, anything posted to it will remain un-
changed. Voters can visit this WBB and confirm that their receipt appears
correctly.
After a suitable period to allow voters to check their receipts, the tellers
perform a robust, anonymising, decryption mix on the batch of posted re-
ceipts. The receipt allows voters to prove the absence or corruption of their
receipt in the event that it fails to appear correctly on the WBB.
Various mechanisms are deployed to detect and deter any corruption in
the construction of the ballot forms. The approach suggested in [2] is to
perform a random pre-audit of the ballot forms.
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4 Cryptographic Voting Protocols: Chinks in the
Armour
The vulnerabilities described here can be placed in four main categories:
subliminal channels, “social engineering”, denial of service attacks, collusion
attacks and implementation flaws.
4.1 Subliminal Channels
Subliminal channels provide a means to transmit information over a chan-
nel in a way that is hidden from the legitimate users of the channel. They
can arise whenever there are alternative valid encodings of the “intended”
information. Additional information can be encoded in suitable choices be-
tween these alternatives. Public access to the WBB makes this a particularly
virulent threat for voter-verifiable schemes.
A standard counter-measure is to require the use of pre-determined ran-
domness. The difficulty with this approach is ensuring that the devices
adhere to this pre-determined entropy. One possibility is to use trusted
hardware, but this of course necessitates the reintroduction of trust assump-
tions.
Subliminal channels, as identified by Karlof et al at least, are not a
problem for Preˆt a` Voter. This is due mainly to the rather special way
that votes are encoded in Preˆt a` Voter. Most cryptographic voting schemes
require the voter to supply her vote choice to the device, which then produces
a (verifiable) encryption. In the case of Preˆt a` Voter, the voter’s choice is
encoded in a randomised frame of reference. It is the information that allows
this frame of reference to be recovered, the “seed” value, that is encrypted,
and this can be done without needing to know the vote value. In Preˆt a`
Voter, the ballot forms are generated in advance and allocated randomly to
voters. Thus, the cryptographic commitments are made before any linkage
to voter identities or vote choices are established.
4.2 Side-channel Attacks
In any scheme in which the vote-capture devices learns the voter’s choice,
there is the possibility leaking the voters choices via side-channels, e.g.,
hidden wires, wireless-enabled devices, etc. In the case of Preˆt a` Voter, as
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explained above, the capture device does not learn the voter’s selection and
hence such channels are not, in fact, a problem. Of course, there may still
be threats of voters being induced to take camera phones into the booths
and so communicating a proof of their selection to coercers or vote buyers.
4.3 Kleptographic Channel Attacks
Preˆt a` Voter is still vulnerable to another form of subliminal channel: a
kleptographic channel [?]. In the case of Preˆt a` Voter, the authority creating
the ballot forms could carefully select the seed values in such a way as
to encode information about the candidate list in the onion values. This
encoding would use some secret key shared with a colluding third party.
Thus, seeds would be chosen so that a keyed hash applied to the onion value
would carry information about the corresponding candidate order.
It is possible to eliminate this kind of attack by arranging for the seeds
to be created in a distributed fashion by several entities in such a way
that no single entity can control or know the resulting seed values. Ryan et
al [9] describes such a mechanism, in which several trustees create encrypted
proto-ballot forms in a kind of pre-mix roughly mirroring the tabulation
mixes.
4.4 Social Engineering Attacks
Many cryptographic voting schemes involve a moderately elaborate “cer-
emony”, to borrow a term from Benaloh. For example, cut and choose
protocols are often used to check that vote values are correctly encoded in
the receipts. The sequence of steps in the protocol is thus highly significant.
By re-ordering the steps in the protocol, or introducing extra ones, the vot-
ing device may be able to corrupt votes with impunity. If voters are alert
enough to notice the manipulation this would not be a problem. But is it
unlikely that voters will understand the procedures and the appreciate their
motivation.
In Preˆt a` Voter, the analogue of the “cut-and-choose” element of the
Chaum or Neff schemes is performed by independent auditing authorities
by checking a random selection of the ballot forms. Thus the voters are not
required to perform a cut-and-choose protocol. The authority commits to
the crypto material on the ballot forms ahead of the election. A random
selection of these are checked by independent auditors for well-formedness.
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This approach sidesteps the social engineering style attacks against the vot-
ers but at the cost of requiring certain trust assumptions about the probity
and independence of the auditing authorities.
4.5 Denial of Service
There are several ways in which denial of service (DoS) attacks could disrupt
or invalidate an election. For all such attacks, adequate error-handling and
recovery strategies need to be in place. In addition, some form of back-up is
desirable, e.g. a voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) [5]. Of course,
such paper audit trails should not be regarded as infallible and incorruptible
either. Ultimately one may need to fall back on the receipts held by the
voters, but here we would be relying on a good proportion of the voters
retaining their receipts.
Whilst these schemes succeed in removing the need to trust the devices
and tellers for the accuracy requirement, we may still be dependent on them
to some extent for availability. Unless suitable measures are taken, the
failure of a teller for example, could at least hold up and in the worst case
block the tabulation. Corruption of the digital copies of receipts would call
the election into doubt. Thus measures must be taken to make the scheme
robust against (manifest) failure or corruption of devices. In other words,
we have ensured that, with high probability, failures or corruption will be
detected, but we still have to address the issue of error handling and recovery.
A recent enhancement to Preˆt a` Voter is to replace the decryption mixes
with re-encryption mixes. This has a number of advantages, one being that
recovery from DoS failures is much easier. There are a number of reasons
for this:
– The mix tellers do not need secret keys, they simply re-randomise
the encryption. A failed mix teller can therefore simply be re-
placed without having to surgically extract keys.
– The mix and audit can be independently re-run. With (deter-
ministic) decryption mixes, the selection of links for audits can-
not be independently selected on the re-run of the mix without
compromising secrecy.
The use of threshold encryption schemes would also help to foil DoS
attacks by ensuring the failure of a proportion of the (decryption) tellers
could be tolerated.
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A further possibility is to introduce a VVPAT [5]-style mechanism. At
the time of vote casting, as the device scans the voter’s receipt, it generates
an extra copy. Once this copy has been verified by the voter (and possibly
an official), it is entered into a sealed audit box. This provides a physical
back-up of receipts cast, should recovery mechanisms need to be invoked.
4.6 Invalid Digital Signatures
In the Chaum scheme, digital signatures act as a counter-measure against
faked receipts being used to discredit election integrity. However, a device
that falsified signatures could be used to discredit voters, leaving them with-
out a way to prove a dishonest system [4].
Voters should thus be provided with devices capable of verifying the dig-
ital signatures. Such devices could be provided at the polling stations by
various independent organisations, such as the Electoral Commission, etc.
This would enable the immediate detection of booth devices providing in-
valid digital signatures on ballot receipts. Similar measures could be utilised
for Preˆt a` Voter.
Given the observation that encrypted receipts can be cast in the presence
of officials and other observers, we have the possibility of checking digital
signatures at the time of casting and applying physical authentication mech-
anisms, such as franking, to the receipt.
We note that, in common with much of the literature, we are assuming
the existence of a secure WBB. More precisely, we are assuming that it is
possible to implement a WBB in such a way as to provide universal read
access and restricted append only access to the appropriate entities. In par-
ticular, we need to ensure that when a voter confirms that their receipt is
accurately displayed on the WBB this will guarantee that it will be fed ac-
curately into the tabulation mix. There must be no way then for the system
to corrupt the receipt values displayed to the voters or to alter the values
after they have been verified. In practice, implementing such mechanisms
will itself be extremely challenging along with the issues of trusted channels
from the WBB to the voters.
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4.7 Undermining Public Confidence in the Secrecy of En-
crypted Receipts
Another potential attack against schemes employing encrypted receipts, is
as follows. The Mafia claim to have a way of extracting a vote from the
encrypted receipt. If a sufficient number of voters were convinced by such a
claim, and so influenced to alter their vote, it may be possible to undermine
the outcome of the election. Countering such a psychological attack, other
than by voter education, is difficult.
Such attacks to undermine confidence are of course not unique to cryp-
tographic schemes, but arguably are of particular concern where encrypted
receipts are used.
4.8 Chain Voting
Chain voting is a well known style of attack that can be effective against
some conventional paper ballot schemes. In this attack, the coercer smuggles
an unused ballot form out of the polling station and marks his preferred
candidate. The voter is told that they will be rewarded if they emerge with
a fresh, unmarked form. This can then be marked again and passed to the
next voter.
Neither the Chaum nor the Neff schemes, in which the ballot forms and
receipts are generated on demand in the booth, are vulnerable to this style
of attack. Preˆt a` Voter is, however, potentially vulnerable, as the ballot
forms are pre-printed.
A counter-measure that is quite effective against this style of attack
against conventional paper voting systems, is to follow the procedure used
for example in France: voters are only registered at the point of casting
their vote (in a sealed envelope). As a result, ballot forms are no longer
a controlled resource, but are freely available at the polling station. Now,
when a voter emerges with a blank form it proves nothing to the vote buyer.
Unfortunately, this counter-measure ceases to be effective where encrypted
receipts and WBBs are used: now the vote buyer can check on the WBB
that the form that they pre-marked for the convenience of the voter was in
fact cast.
Observe that at the time of making her candidate choice, it is only
necessary for the voter to see the candidate list . A possible counter-measure
therefore is to conceal the onion by, for example, a “scratch strip”, similar
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to that used in lottery tickets. The procedure could then be for the voter to
register and collect a fresh ballot form, with scratch strip intact. The voter
goes to the booth, marks her selection, then detaches and destroys the LH
strip. She exits the booth and takes her receipt to an official who checks her
identity and that the scratch strip is intact. The voter, or an official, now
removes the strip and records the receipt as previously described.
A rather different counter-measure is to return to an on-demand creation
of ballot forms, e.g. printing in the booths. An implementation of this in
which forms are distributed with the candidate list in encrypted form and
only decrypted and printed in the booth, can be found in [9]. This avoids
chain-voting and certain chain of custody issues but at the cost of having to
re-introduce the voter involvement in the “cut-and-choose” along with post-
auditing to the protocol. The trade-offs involved in this are investigated
in [8].
This approach might still be vulnerable to a form of randomising attack:
if a coercer can get hold of blank forms they could mark them arbitrarily.
The coercer cannot induce voters to vote for their preferred candidate, but
they could in effect nullify votes.
4.9 Authority knowledge
In the current version of Preˆt a` Voter, the authority has knowledge of ballot
form information, i.e. the crypto seeds used to generate the candidate offsets,
hence the onions, and, in particular, the association between these values.
This means that the authority has to be trusted not to leak this information.
Even if the authority is entirely trustworthy, there is always a danger of this
information being leaked during distribution or storage of the ballot forms,
i.e., chain of custody issues.
The pre-mix approach of [9] alluded to earlier as a counter to klep-
tographic attacks, would also be effective here to eliminate the authority
knowledge problem.
4.10 Enforcing the Destruction of the Left-hand Strips
After the voter’s selection has been marked on the ballot form, the left-hand
strip must be destroyed. Failure to do so would allow the voter to use it as
proof of her vote to a third party. Clearly, this would lay the system open
to coercion.
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Several ways of enforcing this are possible. The voter could be required to
destroy the LH strip in the presence of an official, preferably in a mechanical
shredding device. This could be done at the time of casting the ballot form,
as suggested above. However, care would have to be taken to ensure that
the official is not able to record the association of the receipt and candidate
list. This of course results in the need to place some trust in these officials.
One might arrange for several officials to observe the casting.
Another possibility is to have devices in the booth that would automat-
ically cut off and destroy the LH strip and then pass the receipt into a
scanner. This would make the voter’s interaction simpler, but such devices
would entail trust assumptions again.
A further, rather appealing, possibility is to make “decoy” left-hand
strips freely available in the booths, so the voter cannot convince the coercer
that the one she emerges with is genuine.
4.11 Confusion of Teller Modes
As previously mentioned, the tellers perform an anonymising decryption
mix on the receipts posted to the WBB. However, they also have a role
in checking the construction of ballot forms, both by auditors and, poten-
tially, voters [2]. For ballot forms selected for audit, the onions are sent to
the tellers, who return the corresponding seed values. The auditors then
re-compute the onion values and candidate offsets, and check that they are
correct. In voter checking, the tellers return the candidate ordering corre-
sponding to the onion value sent by the voter.
The checked forms should then be discarded. If the audited forms were
later used to cast a vote, there could be a threat to ballot secrecy. Conversely,
it should not be possible to run a check on a form that has been used to
cast a vote.
To counter this, ballot forms could be checked by voters in the presence
of an official, who then ensures that used forms are discarded. Forms could
be invalidated once used, for example, using the described scratch strip
mechanism. An authentication code could be overprinted on the scratch
strip that would be necessary to enable the checking mode. Revealing the
onion would entail removing the scratch strip and the code along with it,
ensuring that the form could not be reused later.
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5 Conclusions
We have presented an analysis of threats to voter-verifiable election schemes.
The analysis presented here does not constitute an exhaustive, systematic,
identification of all the system-based threats to voter-verifiable schemes.
Arguably, complete coverage for such an analysis could never be guaranteed
given the open-ended nature of systems. However, we feel that this analysis
constitutes a useful first step towards a more systematic analysis technique
for voting systems.
We have the start of a taxonomy of attacks, i.e., classification into sub-
liminal channels, side-channels, kleptographic channels, social engineering
threats, implementation problems, etc. It seems likely that a design-level,
information flow analysis should help guide further analysis. This will be
pursued in future research.
Finally, we conclude that, provided that a full socio-technical perspective
is taken during the design and evaluation of the voting systems, there is
every reason to suppose that cryptographic schemes of this kind can provide
trustworthy, verifiable elections.
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